A simple verification workflow for anyone who archives software packages, builds support kits, or deploys installers on shared machines. Use it before the package lands in a classroom image, support USB, or internal software catalog.
What to do: Confirm that the final download domain matches the software publisher or a publisher-controlled release host such as GitHub Releases.
Why it matters: Many fake download pages mimic product names but redirect to adware bundles or modified installers.
What to do: Use official download pages, enterprise bundles, or signed release assets instead of mirrors with unclear ownership.
Why it matters: Stable vendor-controlled paths are easier to audit, easier to archive, and safer to cite in documentation or deployment scripts.
What to do: On Windows, check the Authenticode signer in file properties; on macOS, verify notarization and developer identity; on Linux, prefer package signatures when available.
Why it matters: A correct signature confirms publisher identity and helps detect tampering after download.
What to do: Record SHA-256 hashes for the exact installer build you deployed, especially for classroom images, support kits, or restricted environments.
Why it matters: Hashes make it easier to reproduce a deployment, validate mirrors, and prove that later installs match the approved build.
What to do: Determine whether the artifact is an MSI, Inno Setup build, NSIS package, ZIP archive, or vendor-managed EXE before writing automation around it.
Why it matters: The silent flags, logging behavior, and per-user versus all-user install patterns differ by installer family.
What to do: Track when an app only offers a web installer, requires online components, or changes its silent install behavior between versions.
Why it matters: These exceptions are often the difference between a reliable fleet deployment and a broken package in the field.
| Vendor or source type | Pattern | What to confirm |
|---|---|---|
| Google Chrome | google.com/chrome or enterprise bundle pages under support.google.com/chrome | The asset is the offline enterprise bundle or vendor-managed download, not a third-party repack. |
| Mozilla Firefox | mozilla.org or firefox-source-docs.mozilla.org | Use the vendor download page or Enterprise documentation when packaging Windows installers. |
| Microsoft Edge / VS Code | microsoft.com, code.visualstudio.com, or GitHub releases published by Microsoft | Match the product channel and architecture; confirm whether you are using user setup, system setup, or ZIP mode. |
| Python | python.org/downloads and docs.python.org | Use the offline/full installer when you need a reusable package; use docs.python.org for command-line options. |
| LibreOffice | libreoffice.org, help.libreoffice.org, or wiki.documentfoundation.org | Prefer The Document Foundation properties rather than mirror or download-wrapper sites. |
| GitHub-hosted projects | github.com/<owner>/<repo>/releases/download/ | Verify the repository owner, release tag, and whether the asset is publisher-signed or hash-verified in release notes. |
Hashes prove that the file you deployed matches the file you approved earlier. They are ideal for package records, reproducibility, and internal audit trails.
Code signatures prove publisher identity. They are the faster first-pass trust check when you are verifying whether an installer really came from the expected vendor.
For high-trust or repeat deployments, use both: confirm the publisher signature first, then record a hash for the specific build you actually deployed.
• Product name and version
• Exact installer filename
• Vendor source URL
• File hash (usually SHA-256)
• Signature or publisher name observed on the file
• Installer type and any silent flags used
Download pages with multiple fake buttons or ads that visually mimic the main action.
Installers hosted on mirror or file-sharing domains with no clear publisher ownership.
Packages whose filename, signer, or release tag does not match the version advertised on the vendor page.
Web installers presented as “offline” packages even though they still pull components during setup.